



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE—WHEN?

BY JAMES H. BLOUNT, LATE JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

AFTER seven years spent at the “storm-centre” of “Expansion,” the first of the seven as a volunteer officer in Cuba, the next two in a like capacity in the Philippines, and the remainder in the last-named country as United States judge, the writer was finally invalidated home last spring, sustained in spirit at parting by cordial farewells, oral and written, personal and official. Having now been invited by the Editor of the REVIEW to prepare an article embodying his views as to our Philippine problem, he naturally enters upon a discussion of the subject with some degree of diffidence, because it involves calling in question the wisdom and righteousness of a policy inaugurated and carried out by a small group of distinguished men, under whom he shared in this nation’s work beyond seas for a very considerable fraction of the average duration of life. However, he can truly say to all former fellow workers:

“I have eaten your bread and salt,
I have drunk your water and wine,
The deaths ye died I have ‘watched beside
And the lives that ye led were mine.

“Was there aught that I did not share
In vigil or toil or ease,—
One joy or woe that I did not know,
Dear friends across the seas?”

In Charles Dickens’s novel “Bleak House,” there is a chapter entitled “Telescopic Philanthropy,” wherein is introduced the famous Mrs. Jellyby, the mother of a large and interesting family, “a lady of very remarkable strength of character, who

devotes herself entirely to the public," who "has devoted herself to an extensive variety of public subjects, at various times, and is at present devoted to the subject of Africa, with a general view to the cultivation of the coffee berry—*and the natives*"; to the great prejudice of her domestic concerns, and the neglect of her own children, the latter continually getting into all kinds of mischief while her attention is diverted from home. Seeing that the present Administration proposes to continue its policy of "benevolent assimilation" in the remote Philippines indefinitely, at whatever cost, the analogy between its attitude and Mrs. Jellyby's misplaced philanthropy toward "the people of Borriboola-Gha, on the left bank of the Niger," is by no means remote.

Mr. Bryan maintains, substantially:*

- (1) That the Filipinos want independence.
- (2) That, if protected from the great land-acquiring Powers, "so far as their own internal affairs are concerned, they do not need to be subject to any alien government."
- (3) That we should at once disclaim any intention of exercising permanent sovereignty over the archipelago, and declare it to be our purpose to remain only long enough to see a stable government started, and then leave them to work out their own destiny.

⁴ Mr. Taft would probably have taken issue with Mr. Bryan on the first proposition up to the time he visited the islands in the summer of 1905, accompanied by a party of Senators and Congressmen. He will hardly do so now.

Senator Dubois, of Idaho, who was a member of the Congressional party referred to, has since said in the New York "Independent":

"All the Filipinos, with the exception of those who were holding positions under and drawing salaries from our Government, favor a government of their own. There is scarcely an exception among them. . . . There is nobody in the islands, no organization of any kind or description, which favors the policy of our Government toward them."

Senator Newlands, of Nevada, also a member of the Congressional party aforesaid, has declared, in the number of this REVIEW for December, 1905, that practically the whole people desire independence. Congressman Parsons, also a member of

* See his newspaper, the "Commoner," of April 27th and May 4th, 1906.

the same party, has since said: "There is no question that all the Filipino parties are now in favor of independence."

Captain J. A. Moss, of the Twenty-fourth Infantry, a member of General Corbin's staff, is quoted by Mr. Bryan, in the "Commoner" of April 27th, 1906, as saying, in an article published in a Manila paper while Mr. Bryan was in the islands, with reference to the wishes of "the great majority" of the Filipinos, that "to please them, we cannot get out of the islands too soon."

Mr. Bryan's second proposition, with which Mr. Taft takes issue, is that "so far as their own internal affairs are concerned, they do not need to be subject to any alien government," provided, of course, they are protected from the danger of annexation by some one of the great nations. If this proposition be sound, subject to the proviso, the proviso can easily be met. The foremost citizen of the world to-day, the man who brought the Japanese-Russian war to a conclusion and thereby won the high regard of all mankind, can, and if so requested by the Congress probably will, within a comparatively short period, negotiate a treaty with the great nations, securing the neutralization of the islands, and the recognition of their independence whenever the same shall be granted to them by the United States. If the Powers should thus agree to consider the Philippines neutral territory forever, Mr. Roosevelt would have done for them exactly what has already been done for Belgium and Switzerland by treaty between the great Powers of Europe. When the resolution of Congressman McCall, of Massachusetts, proposing this, was under consideration before the House Committee on Philippine Affairs on April 7th, 1906, it met with a very considerable degree of sympathy, as is manifest from the official report of the hearing, the main objection apparently being that, because there are a number of different dialects, the Filipinos are a heterogenous lot, and there is no spirit of Philippine nationality. Governor Taft said to the Senate Committee in February, 1902:

"While it is true that there are a number of Christian tribes, so called, that speak different languages, there is a homogeneity in the people in appearance, in habits, and in many avenues of thought. To begin with, *they are all Catholics.*"

The Philippine Census, published by the War Department in March, 1905, says (Vol. I, p. 447):

"A town in the Cagayan valley presents the same style of architecture, the same surrounding *barrios*,* has the same kind of stores and similarly dressed people, as a Christian municipality of the island of Mindanao."

And says the same Government publication (Vol. II, p. 9), in drawing a comparison between itself and the schedules of the twelfth census of the United States:

"Those of the Philippine Census are somewhat simpler, the differences being due mainly to the more homogeneous character of the population of the Philippine Islands!"

The existence of a general and conscious aspiration for a national life of their own, the *Real Presence* of a universal longing to be allowed to pursue happiness in their own way *and not in somebody else's way*, is, to the best of such knowledge and belief as the writer obtained after two years' service in the army that subjugated them, and four years in the Insular Judiciary, one of the most obvious and pathetic facts in the whole situation. During the organized fighting, no American ever discovered that the enemy was crippled, or his effectiveness diminished, by the lack of a common language. And as for the National Spirit, those people have been welded into absolute unity by the events of the last eight years. Rizal was shot for writing a political novel in which the Spaniards thought there was too much recognition of the "Nationalist" idea. And if we should get into a war with a first-class Power, and Aguinaldo, or Juan Cailles, the man who crumpled the gallant Fifteenth Infantry in 1901, should raise the standard of revolt, let the impartial reader ask any American now in the Philippines, or any American who has spent much time there, how many natives between Aparri and Cagayan de Misamis would fail to understand and rally to the cry "*Viva La Republica Filipina!*" Let us hope that if the McCall resolution ever comes up again, the Committee will have become satisfied, beyond the peradventure of a doubt, that there does, in fact, exist among all the people of the Philippine Islands a *consciousness of racial unity*, which draws them together as against all outsiders, and is not marred by any race problem such as exists in Cuba.

The independence of the Philippines should come about within a few years—that is, as soon as practicable—because it is best

* Suburban settlements or rural hamlets.

for both countries. We are governing them against their consent and at an enormous cost to both peoples. If the *untold* millions we have spent on "benevolent assimilation" since February 4, 1899, had been spent on Rivers and Harbors and Canals, and the improvement of our interior water transportation generally, the railroad-rate question would have solved itself without the need of a rate bill. And this is not the only one of Mrs. Jellyby's neglected children, not the only domestic problem which presents a subject for strenuous altruism sufficient to occupy all the patriotism and statesmanship of this great country with its eighty millions of people. If all the splendid ability and grim fortitude that have been concentrated during the last few years upon "telescopic philanthropy" in the Philippines had been steadily focussed upon the economic and social problems which are clamoring ever more loudly and ominously for solution at home, Hearst and Hearstism would never have arisen to voice a profound and widespread discontent having in it an element of righteousness.

But, returning to the core of Mr. Bryan's second proposition, namely, that "so far as their own internal affairs are concerned, they do not need to be subject to any alien government," he further says:*

"There is a wide difference, it is true, between the general intelligence of the educated Filipino and the laborer on the street and in the field, but this is not a barrier to self-government. Intelligence controls in every government, except where it is suppressed by military force. . . . 'Nine-tenths of the Japanese have no part in the lawmaking.' In Mexico, the gap between the educated classes and the peons is fully as great as, if not greater than, the gap between the extremes of Filipino society. Those who question the capacity of the Filipinos for self-government . . . forget that . . . patriotism raises up persons fitted for the work that needs to be done."

And here is the testimony of one of the most distinguished Congressmen who have visited the islands:

"I have little or no doubt that there are a sufficient number of wise and intelligent Filipinos to establish and maintain a government in the Philippines, that will compare in liberality and effectiveness with a very great many of the governments that have been in successful operation for a century or more."

Edmund Burke once said, in a speech for which Americans

* "Commoner," April 27th, 1906.

have long delighted to honor his memory: "The general character and situation of a people must determine what sort of government is fitted for them. That, nothing else can or ought to determine."

The Congressman last above quoted talks of twenty years as a safe period of tutelage, Senators Newlands and Dubois of thirty years, Mr. Bryan of five, or ten, or fifteen. But the gentleman last named insisted at the Convention of 1904, and still insists, that we should make them a definite promise of independence *now*, the same to be executed as soon as practicable.

To this, the proposition of the Democracy, Mr. Taft's answer is:

"The gentlemen that are looking for office under an independent government, have very little concern about independence that is to come after they are dead; and if you permit their independence, and make it a definite promise, you will have a continued agitation there as to when they ought to have independence."*

The imputation of selfishness put by this statement upon all Filipinos who desire independence is uncalled for. "The gentlemen that are looking for office under an independent government" could undoubtedly get office under the present government *if they would only stop wanting independence*. And "if you permit their independence, and make it a definite promise," you will have no agitation to hasten the day, *provided the promise itself fix the day*. During nearly four years of service on the bench in the Philippines, the writer heard as much genuine, impassioned and effective eloquence from Filipino lawyers, saw exhibited in the trial of causes as much industrious preparation, and zealous, loyal advocacy of the rights of clients, as any ordinary *nisi prius* judge at home is likely to meet with in the same length of time. Some of these lawyers are ex-officers of the insurgent army. Each of them has his clients, and is the centre of a circle of influence. All of them, without exception, want independence. Of course the law of self-preservation precludes them from proclaiming this from the house-tops, especially if they are holding office under the Government. But in their heart of hearts, the dearest hope that each of them cherishes is that he may live to see the Star of the Philippine Republic

* Speech at Cincinnati, February 22nd, 1904.

risen in the Far East. Let a date be fixed by the United States Congress for turning over the government of the Archipelago to its people, a date which will afford to the great majority of the present generation a reasonable expectation of living to see the independence of their country, and all political unrest, including most of the brigandage in the islands, will at once cease. The news will spread "like wildfire," to borrow a famous phrase of our sunshiny Secretary of War. We shall have exchanged a balking horse for a willing one. The sullen submission of a conquered people will give place to genuine and universal gratitude toward America. The unborn National Life will leap for joy in the Womb of Time. *Te Deums* will be celebrated in every church of every town in the Archipelago from Aparri to Zamboanga. Aglipay himself may even say: "Now, Lord, let my schism depart in peace, for mine eyes have seen Thy salvation."

The great ocean steamship companies of the world publish the sailing-dates of their vessels a year ahead. Everything else hinges upon this point of departure. All preparations, whether by crew, shippers or prospective passengers, are shaped to that end. Why cannot the same be done in the matter of the launching of a Ship of State? If three strong and able men, familiar with insular conditions, and still young enough to undertake the task—say, for instance, General Leonard Wood, of the Army; Judge Adam C. Carson, of the Philippine Supreme Court; and W. Morgan Shuster, Collector of Customs of the Archipelago; or three other men of like calibre—were told by a President of the United States, by authority of the Congress: "Go out there and set up a respectable native government in ten years, and then come away," they could and would do it, and that government would be a success; and one of the greatest moral victories in the annals of free government would have been written by the gentlemen concerned upon the pages of their country's history.

To understand the causes of the present discontent, and how incurable it is except by a promise of independence at a fixed date, let me review this tragedy of errors which we have written in blood and selfish legislation in that unhappy land, as rapidly as may be consistent with clearness and commensurate with the ability of an inconsiderable person,—an individual whose only claim to be heard upon a great question like this must rest upon the circumstance that he was an eye-witness to the tragedy.

When trouble began to brew in the Philippines after the signing of the treaty of Paris, the Schurman Commission, it will be remembered, was sent out, bringing the olive branch. It accomplished nothing. It was too late. War ensued. When the writer reached Manila early in November, 1899, he was detailed to the command of a company of Maccabebe scouts, to develop fire for General Lawton's Division, their commanding officer, Lieutenant Boutelle, of the Artillery, having been killed the day before. On the way to join them, he met General Lawton's Adjutant-General at a place called San Isidro. The Colonel said: "We took this town last spring, after a pretty stiff fight. Then, as a result of the negotiations of the Schurman Commission, General Otis had us evacuate this place and fall back. We have just had to take it again." The Schurman Commission hoped that the Filipinos could be persuaded to give up their idea of independence. The Army knew better.

In the first half of 1899, General Otis inexcusably postponed recommending to President McKinley the call for Federal Volunteers. He did not really understand the seriousness of the situation. He conducted the campaign all the time he was there from a desk in Manila, and never once took the field.

The Volunteer Army of 1899 was to last, under the act of Congress, for two years only—that is, until the close of the fiscal year ending June 30th, 1901. The insurrection had to be over at that time, whether or no. To use an expression of the theatrical managers, that date was to be "positively its last appearance." The Volunteers began their work in the fall of 1899, twenty-five regiments of them, and, shoulder to shoulder with the Regulars, pegged away cheerfully at the war, doing their country's work; and they had been vigorously convincing the Filipinos of the benevolence of our intentions for about nine months, when the idea of a second Philippine Commission, a second olive branch, was conceived at Washington. The Presidential election was to occur in the following November, and men high in the councils of the Republican party at home believed that the success of the party would be seriously imperilled if the situation did not soon clear up, or at least improve, in the Philippines. The public press of that period contains interviews with such men, of the tenor indicated. In this state of the case, the Taft Commission was sent out. Things looked dismal. Philippine

stock was going down. Optimism was devoutly to be wished. Judge Taft did not disappoint his friends at home. He was not then a judge. He was a partisan of the Republican party, an advocate. And, like many another able advocate, he persuaded himself that the witnesses whose testimony militated against his client's interest were, if not mendacious, at least blinded with prejudice. He accepted the views of natives not in arms, as against that of the army.

In June, 1900, when the Taft Commission arrived, the military authorities had not forgotten the Schurman Commission, and the folly of its efforts to mix peace with war; and they did not look forward with enthusiasm to the coming of the new outfit. These latter brought with them, like the Schurman Commission, the theory that kindness would win the people over; and they at once proceeded to act conformably to that amiable delusion. Of course it was not long before they found abundant evidence to support their preconceived theory. Accordingly, on November 30th, 1900, they made their first report to the Secretary of War, in which, among other things, they announced this tragically optimistic conclusion:

“A great majority of the people long for peace, and are entirely willing to accept the establishment of a government under the supremacy of the United States.”

The army entertained a diametrically opposite opinion. The military view of the situation about the same time was thus satirically expressed in General MacArthur's Annual Report to the Secretary of War:

“ . . . The people seem to be actuated by the idea that in all doubtful matters of politics or war, men are never nearer right than when going with their own kith and kin. . . .”

Allusion is then made to the “almost complete unity of action of the entire native population. That such unity is a fact is too obvious to admit of discussion.” Then follows this humorous thrust: “ . . . The adhesive principle comes from *ethnological homogeneity*, which induces men to respond for a time to the appeals of *consanguineous leadership*. ”

If the Volunteers whose term of enlistment was scheduled to expire with the fiscal year, June 30th, 1901, should have to be replaced by anything like an equal number of other troops, a

call for further appropriations to conduct a long-drawn-out and unpopular war, would surely try the patience of the American people, and endanger the ultimate fortunes of the Republican party. Everything had to be shaped to avoid such a catastrophe. Whether the country should be ready for civil government on that date or not, *it had to be*. When Joel Chandler Harris's creation, "Uncle Remus," tells his little friend the story of Brer Rabbit's climbing the tree to elude the dogs, and the lad interrupts: "But, Uncle Remus, a rabbit can't climb a tree," the resourceful narrator very promptly replies: "Oh, but, honey, *dis* rabbit des 'bleegeed ter climb *dis* tree." The Administration was 'bleegeed to climb the tree of Civil Government. Civil Government was therefore duly inaugurated on July 4th, 1901.

Within less than six months thereafter, the flames of insurrection broke out anew in Batangas and the adjacent provinces, and it became necessary to give the military a free hand. General J. Franklin Bell accordingly invaded Batangas and the region round about, with an ample force, a brigade, and proceeded to wage *war*—the sort of war General Sherman described, only more so; for General Sherman did not practise reconcentration. General Bell went there to make those people "long for peace." And he did make them "long for peace," or, to use his own language, "want peace and want it badly." General Bell is not to be blamed for this. He is a brave and skilful soldier, one of the best in our own or any other army. He was simply doing his duty, obedient to orders. This Batangas insurrection of 1901-2 would never have occurred had not Governor Taft persisted in believing that the Filipinos could be genuinely satisfied with something less than independence. This error led him to reduce, most imprudently, the army of occupation and the number of army posts, against military advice, thereby giving the insurrection a chance to get its second wind. If the army of occupation had not been so reduced, reconcentration would never have been necessary, in Batangas or elsewhere. Reconcentration tactics are born of numerical weakness. If you have troops enough thoroughly to police a given territory, no need for reconcentration will arise there. Reconcentration is an admission that you are not able constantly to provide protection for all the people. As a corollary of the fundamental mistake indicated, a constabulary force was organized, which, it was believed, could control

the situation. That it has never been able to do so is a matter of record in the official publications both of the Manila and of the Washington Government. The fact is solemnly admitted in the recitals of a law now on the statute-books of the Philippine Islands. Section 6 of Act numbered 781 of the Philippine Commission, approved June 1st, 1903, providing for reconcentration, begins thus:

"In provinces which are infested to such an extent with ladrones or outlaws that the lives and property of residents in the outlying barrios are rendered wholly insecure by continued predatory raids, and such outlying barrios thus furnish to the ladrones or outlaws their sources of food-supply, and it is not possible, with the available police forces constantly to provide protection, etc."

Such are the conditions which to-day warrant reconcentration in the Philippines—whenever “it is not possible with the available police forces” to protect the peaceably inclined people. It will thus be seen that we are now doing in the Philippines the very thing for which we drove Weyler and his Spaniards from the Western Hemisphere. Reconcentration under the military authorities is bad enough, even with the superb equipment of the commissary and quartermaster departments of the army. But reconcentration conducted by inexperienced civilians and unfriendly constabulary is simply unsportsmanlike.

Caring for the peaceably inclined people, or *pacificos*, as they were called in Cuba,—those who upon being told to do so voluntarily come within the zone or radius prescribed in the order for reconcentration—is not the only problem which can be competently handled by the military alone. There are the prisoners brought in by the policing force, from time to time, because found outside the prescribed radius, and put in the provincial jail. An ordinary jail, with 400 to 800 people crowded into it within a short period of time, cannot be properly handled by inexperienced hands. The sanitary conditions are sure to become bad and foul, and more or less disease and death is certain to ensue.

In the latter part of 1903, about the middle of November, the writer was sent to hold court in the province of Albay, where quite a formidable insurrection had been in progress for about a year, *without suspension of civil government*. There had been as many as 1,500 men in the field on each side, at times. Reconcentration under the law quoted had been resorted to. There

had been as many as 700 or 800 prisoners in the provincial jail at one time, so he was told. Toward the close of the term, just after Christmas, when most of the docket had been disposed of, and there was time for matters more or less perfunctory in their nature, the prosecuting attorney brought in rough drafts of two proposed orders for the court to sign. One was headed with a list of fifty-seven names, the other with a list of sixty-three names. Both orders recited that the foregoing persons had died in the jail—all but one between May 20th and December 3rd, 1903 (roughly six and one-half months), as will appear from an examination of the dates of death—and concluded by directing that the indictments against them be quashed. The writer was only holding an extraordinary term of court there, and was about to leave the province. The regular judge of the district was scheduled soon to arrive. He did not sign the proposed orders, therefore, but kept them as legal curios. A correct translation of one of them appears below, followed by the list of names which headed the other (identical) order.*

If the military authorities had had charge of those prisoners, it

* THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ALBAY.

THE UNITED STATES

against

	Died.	Died.
Cornelio Rigorosa	Dec. 3 1903	Eusebio Payadan
Fabian Basques	Sept. 25, "	Leonardo Rebusti
Julian Nacion	Oct. 14, "	Julian Riobaldis
Francisco Rigorosa	Oct. 18, "	Victor Riobaldis
Anacleto Solano	Nov. 25, "	Mauricio Balbin
Valentino Cesillano	Nov. 6, "	Tomas Regidor
Felix Sasutona	Sept. 26, "	Miguel de los Santos
Marcelo de los Santos	June 3, "	Eustaquio Mapula
Marcelo Patingo	Nov. 15, "	Eugenio Lomibao
Juan Raynante	Sept. 7, "	Francisco Luna
Dionisio Carifaga	Oct. 4, "	Gregorio Sierte
Felipe Navor	Sept. 17, "	Teodoro Patingo
Luis Nicol	Nov. 23, "	Teodorico Tua
Baiblino Nicol	Sept. 23, "	Ceferino Octia
Damiano Nicol	Nov. 23, "	Graciona Pamplona
Leoncio Sabalburo	Nov. 20, "	Felipe Bonifacio
Catalino Sideria	July 25, "	Baltazar Bundi
Marcelo Ariola	Oct. 26, "	Julian Locot
Francisco Cao	Nov. 26, "	Francisco de la Punta
Martin Olaguer	Nov. 13, "	Pedro Madrid
Juan Nerlic	Nov. 16, "	Felipe Pusiquit
Eufemio Bere	Nov. 21, "	Rufo Mansalan
Julian Sotero	Oct. 30, "	Ignacio Titano
Juan Payadan	Sept. 20, "	Alfonso Locot
Benedicto Milla	July 30, "	Gil Locot
Placido Porlage	June 18, "	Regino Bitarra
Gaudencio Ogulta	Oct. 11, "	Bonifacio Bo
Alberto Cabrera	Sept. 8, "	Francisco de Belen
Julian Payadan	Aug. 4, "	Sept. 29, "

is safe to say that the mortality among them would have been far less, that possibly half, or even three-fourths, of those who died, would have lived. Political necessity, inherent in our form of government, kept the army from acting then, and keeps it from talking now.

When the civil government was set up in July, 1901, the army took a back seat, and looked on with more or less impatience, ready to say, "I told you so"—eager, of course, to get a chance to fight again. Gentlemen of the military profession have a predilection that way. The writer was, of course, entirely in sympathy with the civil authorities, having been promoted from the army to the judiciary, and rather enjoyed seeing the army behave with becoming subordination, according to orders, even if

DECREE.

The defendants above named, charged with divers crimes, having died in the Provincial Jail by reason of various ailments, upon various dates, according to official report of the jailer, it is
 ORDERED by this court that the cases pending against the said deceased persons be and the same are hereby quashed, the costs to be charged against the government.

Albay, December 28, 1903.

Judge of the 12th District
 Acting in the 8th.

The foregoing order contains fifty-seven names. As indicated in the text, the second order was like the first. It contained the names of sixty-three other deceased prisoners, as follows, to wit:

	Died.		Died.
Anacleto Avila.....	Sept. 2, 1903	Albino Oyardo	Oct. 1, 1903
Gregorio Saquedo	July 21, "	Felipe Rotaria	Sept. 29, "
Francisco Almonte	Oct. 11, "	Urbano Saralde	Oct. 5, "
Faustino Sallao	Oct. 9, "	Gil Mediavillo	June 13, "
Leocadio Peña	Oct. 16, "	Egidio Mediavillo	June 16, "
Juan Ranuco	Oct. 16, "	Mauricio Losano	Oct. 5, "
Esteban de Lima	Feb. 4, "	Bernabe Carenan	Sept. 27, "
Estanislao Jacoba	Oct. 7, "	Pedro Sagaysay	Sept. 29, "
Macario Ordiales	Oct. 19, "	Laureano Ibo.....	Aug. 5, "
Laureano Ordeales	Oct. 27, "	Vicente Sanosong	July 17, "
Reimundo Narito	Oct. 4, "	Francisco Morante	June 10, "
Antonio Polvorido	Sept. 12, "	Anatolito Sadullo	Sept. 16, "
Norverto Melgar	June 14, "	Lucio Rebeza	Aug. 27, "
Bartolome Rico	Nov. 8, "	Eugenio Sanbuena	Aug. 13, "
Simon Ordiales	Sept. 13, "	Nicolas Oberos	Aug. 26, "
Candido Rosari	Sept. 29, "	Eusebio Rambillo	Sept. 13, "
Saturnino Vuelvo	Oct. 18, "	Tomas Rempillo	Aug. 19, "
Vicente Belsalda	May 26, "	Daniel Patasin	Aug. 19, "
Felix Canaria	June 12, "	Ignacio Bundi	Sept. 7, "
Pedro Cuya	July 26, "	Juan Locot	May 23, "
Evaristo Dias	July 24, "	Zacarias David Padilla	Aug. 7, "
Felix Padre	July 8, "	Juan Almazar	Sept. 12, "
Alberto Mantes	Aug. 7, "	Rufino Quipi	June 13, "
Joaquin Maamot	Sept. 5, "	Antonio Brio	June 13, "
Santiago Cacero	May 28, "	Timoteo Enciso	Sept. 12, "
Hilario Zalazar	July 26, "	Hilario Palaad	Aug. 28, "
Tomas Odsinada	Oct. 1, "	Ventura Prades	May 24, "
Julian Oco	Oct. 4, "	Alejandro Alevanto	May 22, "
Jullan Lontac	Aug. 27, "	Rufino Pelicia	May 20, "
Ambrosio Rabosa	Sept. 19, "	Alejo Bruequeza	July 19, "
Mariano Garcia	Sept. 12, "	Prudencio Estrada	Sept. 15, "
Ramon Madrigalejo	Aug. 19, "		

it did not like to do so. It is human nature to enjoy the possession of power. Nor did he ever give much thought one way or the other to the question of the original wisdom of setting up the civil government against military advice, until he became aware of the death of these 120 prisoners in the Albay jail. This gave him pause. It was impossible to escape the reflection that just about that number had died in the Black Hole of Calcutta. After that, however, he labored all the harder to uphold the civil government by speedy trials of persons incarcerated, with a view to minimizing the necessity for the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*; and, finally, early in November, 1904, in the province of Samar, broke completely down in health from trying to dispose properly of overcrowded jails, before the people awaiting trial died. The province of Samar was at that time being overrun by several thousand brigands,* and in less than one hundred days more than 50,000 people had been made homeless by their depredations, according to the sworn testimony of a constabulary officer of the province, who appeared as a witness before the court presided over by the author of this paper.† Why was not the situation turned over to the military authorities? It was, later. But is an ambitious Chief of Constabulary of a civil government going to admit, on the eve of a Presidential election in the United States, that the public disorder in the Philippines is too great for him and his corps—the right arm of the civil government—to handle?

When the constabulary cannot protect the peaceably inclined coast people, these latter are compelled, even if they are not already in active sympathy with their hardier brethren of the highlands, to get up a *modus vivendi*, whereby they become, *ipso facto*, accessories to the crime of "Brigandage,"—technically, at least. The writer did not meet this ugly proposition in concrete form, in the case of any specific defendant. But it would have come, sooner or later, had he remained in Samar. He left that ill-fated island, November 8th, 1904, determined, if he could get well, to ask to be stationed in Manila. For, as Edmund Burke said in his speech on "Conciliation with America," "I do not know the method of drawing an indictment against a whole people."

* Representing primarily the embers of the late war, fanned into flame by the exactions of the tax-gatherer and the usurer.

† This witness did not attempt to estimate the number that had been killed, wounded or kidnapped.

Looked at from the Oriental end of the line, the governing of the Philippines by their supposed friends from the antipodes has been not unlike a game of battledore and shuttlecock between rival political creeds at home, in which the unfortunate inhabitants have been the shuttlecock.

Space does not remain sufficient to do more than briefly suggest how true this is, also, of the Washington end of the line.

For the benefit of American cotton manufacturers, cheap English textiles, previously worn by and satisfactory to millions of poor natives, have been shut out of the Philippines by a practically prohibitive import duty, a surtax of 100 per cent., imposed by the United States Congress (Act of February 25th, 1906.)*

For the benefit of American shipping interests, the Philippines have been treated by our maritime legislation as part of the United States, by extension of the coastwise shipping laws to the Archipelago.

For the benefit of American sugar and tobacco interests, the Philippines have been treated by our tariff legislation as foreign territory. Those interests defeated the effort to give to the islands the benefit of a reduction of the duty on Philippine products to twenty-five per cent. of the Dingley Tariff, their representative insisting before the Committee on Ways and Means, almost in the language of Mrs. Jellyby's critics, "I believe our own children have more claim upon us." The leading Filipinos perceive, as clearly as we Americans do, that in the nature of things this sort of argument will always be an obstacle in the path of their progress, so long as human nature retains a modicum of selfishness.

The instinct of self-preservation of our own sugar and tobacco producers would surely be satisfied with and lend their support to a free-trade—or at least a lower tariff—measure between this country and the Philippines, if the same were coupled with a promise of independence within a decade. This seems to be the only solution that is at once righteous and practicable. It is the only lever that will lift the Philippine Ship of State upon the ways, and launch her successfully upon the voyage of national life.

JAMES H. BLOUNT.

* An eloquent and indignant protest against this by Rev. Charles H. Brent, Episcopal Bishop of the Philippines, appeared in "The Outlook" for July 19th, 1906.